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A NEW CHAPTER IN THE NEW YORK LAW
OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS1
J. FREDERic TAYLOR
As the result of a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett,2 charitable corporations find new uncertain-
ties in the law governing the administration of their funds. Such corporations
perform important educational, religious and eleemosynary services, and in
the interest" of a sound continuance of these services it is desirable that the
uncertainties should be adequately resolved. In anticipation of a possible
legislative clarification of the law, it seems expedient to review the decision
and the perplexing questions that stem from it. The decision itself is clear,
both as to the facts and the holding.
The suit was for a declaratory judgment. The hospital asked the court
to declare that a bequest of money which, by the terms of the will, was "to
be held as an endowment fund and the income used for the ordinary expenses
of maintenance" was not a trust fund but an absolute gift to the hospital
which it might use to discharge a first mortgage on the hospital property.
The Supreme Court granted the. petition 3 and the Appellate Division affirmed
the judgment. 4 On appeal by the Attorney General to the Court of Appeals,
the judgment below was reversed.5 The Court of Appeals held that the
testator's words quoted above clearly evidenced his intention that the gift
should be held as a permanent or "endowment" fund, that only the income
of the fund should be used for hospital purposes, and that this was an
enforceable condition of the gift.
While charitable corporations generally have carried out in good faith the
conditions imposed by donors, it has been thought that under New York law
a donor's words of restriction or direction as to use were precatory only and
did not impose an obligation enforceable against the corporation.6 The pre-
vailing opinion of the Appellate Division in the hospital case clearly expressed
this view.
"The words of intention ate clear, but do not impose a legal obligation.
-.. We are not dealing, however, with what ought to be done, but with
'Charitable corporations as used here and as commonly understood in New York law
include not only corporations limited to eleemosynary purposes but also those organized
for religious and educational purposes.
-281 N. Y. 115, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939).
'Special Term, Onondaga County.
'256 App. Div. 120, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (4th Dep't 1939).
'See note 2, supra.
"Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450 (1873); Corporation of the Chamber of Commerce of
N. Y. v. Bennett, 143 Misc. 513, 257 N. Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; (1939) 23 MINN. L.
REv. 670; (1939) 53 HAnv. L. Rv. 327.
CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS 383
what must be done. As long as the corporation uses the funds which
are its property absolutely for its corporate purposes, neither the donor's
representatives nor the State may intervene to require a strict compliance
with the donor's expressed intentions."' 7
Justice Lewis, dissenting in the Appellate Division, had a different opinion.8
"Whether we are to regard the respondent's duty, upon accepting a
bequest thus burdened, as fiduciary in character or as impressed with
a duty which bears some other legal label, I am not in accord with a
ruling which construes as futile the clear language deliberately employed
by the testator to define the use he intended for his gift."9
The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, held' 0 that the
gift did not create a trust in the st-ict legal sense, because "trustee and
beneficiary are one," but that it was a gift for a directed purpose to which
the corporation must adhere unless and until the court, applying the cy pres
doctrine, should permit its use for another purpose. The Court of Appeals
was not unanimous. judge Hubbs wrote a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge
Crane concurring, in which the view was expressed, derived from examining
a long line of New York cases,1 that the gift to the hospital was absolute
and therefore the testator's direction that the gift be used for a specified
purpose amounted only to a request which dia not, in law, limit the corpora-
tion's use of the fund.
The prevailing and dissenting opinions in the two courts reveal most in-
terestingly the confusion in the cases prior to the decision. Undoubtedly
the decision clarifies the New York rule on the single issue litigated. Prob-
ably it changes the rule. judge Hubbs and Judge Sears seem to believe that
it does.12 But there are related questions that remain unanswered, and be-
cause of this decision s these questions are occasioning new perplexities for
the trustees of charitable corporations in New York and elsewhere.
These questions include the following which are discussed in this article.
I. Are gifts to charitable corporations for specified purposes to be classified
as true trusts, implied trusts or quasi trusts, or are they merely restricted
7256 App. Div. 120, 121, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (4th Dep't 1939).8It is interesting to note that Justices Sears and Lewis, who respectively wrote the
prevailing and dissenting opinions in the Appellate Division, are now judges of the Court
of Appeals.
9256 App. Div. 120, 124, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (4th Dep't 1939).
2°281 N. Y. 115, 123, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939).
nSherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921) ; Bird v. Merk-
lee, 144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645 (1895); Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450 (1873);
Brayton v. Rector of Christ Church, 249 App. Div. 290, 292 N. Y. Supp. 131 (4th Dep't
1936) ; Corp. of Chamber of Commerce v. Bennett, 143 Misc. 513, 257 N. Y. Supp. 2
(Sup. Ct. 1932).
12281 N. Y. 115, 128, 22 N. E. (2d) 305, 256 App. Div. 120, 122, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 922
(4th Dep't 1939).
='281 N. Y. 115, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939).
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gifts that create an obligation, sui generis, enforceable against the donee
corporation? Does the language of the gift determine or affect such classi-
fication ?
II. Are gifts for "endowment" to be classified as trusts or restricted
gifts or are they unrestricted? What are the enforceable obligations, if any,
as to the donee's use of the corpus of gifts for endowment?
III. May charitable corporations commingle or pool, for investment with
their other funds, the corpus of gifts for specified purposes?
IV. Does the enforceable obligation, which the Court of Appeals recog-
nized in the St. Joseph 's Hospital case, impose an obligation to meet ordinary
trust standards in the investment of the corpus of such gifts?
V. How will the obligations of charitable corporations with respect to their
restricted gifts be enforced?
I
Prior to 1893 an uncertain and shifting public policy as to charitable
trusts and uses was largely responsible for confusion in the New York law.
The English statute of charitable trusts and uses, known as the Statute of
Elizabeth,14 had been law in the colony of New York but -the new state in a
spirit of revolutionary fervor repealed all acts of the British Parliament,
including that statute.' 5 A hundred years of litigation and uncertainty
reached a climax when the will of Hon. Samuel J. Tildert came before the
courts for construction.' 6 Mr. Tilden had been a distinguished member of
the 2New York bar and his will gave evidence of careful drafting. None-
theless his charitable dispositions, for the founding of a free public library in
New York City, were frustrated because the New Yorlk law recognized as
valid only those charitable trusts of which the beneficiaries were immediately
ascertainable persons.1 7 Those trusts which were for indefinite beneficiaries
would not be enforced. Public opinion was aroused and in 1893 a statute of
charitable trusts and uses, commonly called the Tilden Act, was enacted.'8
This statute substantially reintroduced into New York law the English
statute which had prevailed in colonial New York.
The effects of the earlier confusion are still found in New York law, notably
in the cases construing gifts to charitable corporations. In order to uphold
:"43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601).
'L. 1788, 6. 46, § 37. Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525 (1853) held that the English
law of charitable uses became the law of this state, but after a series of decisions culmin-
ating with that in Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332 (1873), the opposite view prevailed.
:"Tilden v. Greene, 54 Hun 231, 7 N. Y. Supp. 382 (1st Dep't 1889).
" Tilden v. Green (sic), 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880 (1891). Saxe, Our New York
System of Charities, The Cy Pres Doctrine. Reprinted from the New York State Bar
Association Bulletin of June, 1937.
'L. 1893, c. 701, §§ 1, 2; PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 12; REAL PROPERTY LAW
§ 113.
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the donor's or testator's charitable intentions as far as it was reasonably
possible to do so, the courts frequently construed gifts to charitable corpora-
tions as outright gifts even when the terms of gift contained express trust
language or other words importing a charitable use.19
It was recognized that such gifts were not "true trusts" because of the
identity of trustee and beneficiary. When the estate of the trustee rand that
of the beneficiary merge in one entity, the trust is extinguished and the
trustee-beneficiary takes the entire estate.2 0  However, if gifts to a charit-
able corporation that were expressed to be in trust or for specified purposes
actually did not partake of the nature of a trust or use, then the doctrine
of cy pres would be inapplicable and many gifts for charity would neces-
sarily fail of accomplishing the benevolent purposes which their donors
contemplated.
Cy pres is the principle by which, if the original objects of a charitable
trust or use can no longer be fulfilled, the courts will carry out a donor's
"general charitable intent," if clearly expressed, by applying the gift to
some parallel or related charitable purpose. Cy pres was incorporated
into the statute law of England by 'the Statute of Elizabeth, which was
early abrogated in New York22 and not fully reintroduced until 1893 when
the Tilden Act was enacted.23  It has been held that courts will not use
their cy pres powers with respect to outright gifts, but only where the gift,
grant, devise or bequest is for a religious, educational, charitable or benevolent
trust or "use"
24
Having held that restricted gifts to charitable corporations, even when
expressed as trusts, were not trusts but outright gifts and having refused
to apply the cy pres principle to outright gifts, there was an embarrassing
problem when cases came before the courts which called for application of
the cy pres principle in order that the donor's charitable intention might be
continued after the original donee had ceased to exist or where for some
other reason it had become impossible for the original donee to execute the
donor's charitable intent. In 1921 the Court of Appeals, in Sherman v.
'St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908) ; Robb v. Wash-
ington and Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906) ; Tabernacle Baptist
Church v. Fifth Avenue Baptist Church, 60 App. Div. 327, aff'd, 172 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E.
1126 (1902). Cf. Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 31 F. (2d) 469, 479 (D. Md. 1929),
aff'd, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 4th 1930), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 733 (1930). Cf. also
Dwyer v. Leonard, 100 Conn. 513, 124 AtI. 28 (1924).
Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921); Swisher v.
Swisher, 157 Iowa 55, 62, 137 N. W. 1076 (1912). Cf. Curtis & Barker v. Central Uni-
versity, 188 Iowa 300, 320, 176 N. W. 330 (1920).
2143 Eliz. c. 4 (1601).
2 L. 1788, c. 46, § 37.
2L. 1893, c. 701, §§ 1, 2; PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 12; REAL PROPERTY LAW § 113.
'Fralick v. Lyford, 107 App. Div. 543 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 187 N. Y. 524, 79 N. E. 1105
(1907).
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Richmond Hose Co.,25 squarely met this issue and held that, while the trust
was not an ordinary trust created by a donor, it was nevertheless a trust
created by the charter of the charitable corporation and cy pres could be
applied as to a charitable trust. In the Sheri nan case the bequest contained
no trust language but the will of the testatrix specified that the fund should
be held by the corporation and the income used for its corporate charitable
purposes. The Court of Appeals said :26
"This gift created no trust....
"The doctrine of charitable uses involving the idea of a trust and
indefinite beneficiaries did not become part of the law of New York.
[citing cases]. We thought it better to limit a charitable gift in per-
petuity to those instances where it was made absolutely to a corporation
whose objects were approved by the legislature and which was author-
ized to accept it under such conditions as the legislature might impose.
[citing cases]. Yet the kind of uses called charitable are of assistance
in deciding what is a charitable purpose....
"Holding as we do that this was a bequest for a charitable purpose
to a corporation authorized by its charter to receive bequests for that
purpose the answer to this problem is clear. . . . It held the property
in trust-not a trust imposed by the donor but by the charter which
required the corporation to perpetually devote its funds to such pur-
poses. [citing cases]. To hold otherwise would be to permit the des-
truction of the greater part of the charitable bequests made in this state
during the last century."
According to the ancient definition a "use" was a beneficial interest which
limited the holder of the legal title in his enjoyment of the property. It has
been said that there is no more all-embracing term for any estate which is
less than legal.27 The holder of the "use" was called the cestui que use.?8
This concept of a "use" prevailed when the Statute of Elizabeth29 was en-
acted. After the enactment of the Tilden Act in New York,8 0 the courts
held that it had restored in this state the English law of charitable uses
effective at the time of the Revolution.3 '
The Sherman case3 2 appears to be the first clear indication in New York
that courts will find a "use" within the meaning of the Tilden Act even
Where, as in the case of charitable corporations, the legal and equitable
z 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921). Cf. Matter of Merritt, 280 N. Y. 391, 21
N.E. (2d) 365 (1939).
c"1230 N. Y. 462, 467-468, 472, 130 N. E. 613 (1921).
2'Matter of Scharmann, 63 Misc. 640, 642, 118 N. Y. Supp. 687 (Surr. Ct. 1909).
11 C. 3. 225.
'43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601).
'1893 (See note 23, spra).
3'Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568 (1899).
'230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921).
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titles have merged.3 To like effect is Matter of Walter,"4 in which Sur-
rogate Foley states :5
"It is argued by counsel for the next of kin that the cy pres rule may
not be invoked for the reason that the bequest to the hospital was absolute
and not a gift in trust. This contention has no merit. Under the pro-
visions of section 12 of the Personal Property Law and the pertinent
authorities, a gift to a charitable organization, although in outright terms,
is, nevertheless, a gift in trust for the general purposes of the institution
as defined by its certificatd of incorporation. If it is reasonably certain
that the testator intended that the bequest be devoted to purposes of
charity, even where there is no formal trust, a 'gift in trust will be
implied'."
Surrogate Foley cited as authority Matter of Durbrow36 and the Sherman
case.
3 7
In our day charities, including in that term eleemosynary, educational and
religious objects, are administered almost exclusively by corporations.
Gifts to such corporations for one or more of their corporate purposes, even
where trust language is used in the terms of gift, are not true trusts because
of the merger of the legal and equitable estates.88 This condition has
regulted through judicial decisions in a new definition of charitable trusts
and uses, a definition which differs from the concept of trusts and uses
commonly accepted in England when the Statutd of Elizabeth was enacted.3 9
Mr. Justice Andrews in the Sheran case4° frankly accepted as a "charit-
able use" the charitable purposes established by the corporate charter and
held the gift to be a trust established, not by the donor, but by the provisions
of the corporate charter. Surrogate Foley in Matter of Walter~a arrived
at substantially the same result, holding that there was an implied trust but
no formal trust. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in a recent case
designated this legal relationship as a qiusi trust.42 Now, in the St. Joseph's
Hospital case,43 the New York Court of Appeals seems frankly to have
abandoned the theory that there is a trust, actual or implied, but does hold
that the gift to the corporation for specified purposes created an "obliga-
tion" which is enforceable by the Attorney General against the donee cor-
'St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N. Y. 115, 123, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939).
3150 Misc. 512, 269 N. Y. Supp. 402 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
1'Id. at 514.
M245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747 (1927).
-230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921).
MSee notes 19 and 20, supra.
311601.1-230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921).
"150 Misc. 512, 269 N. Y. Supp. 402 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
'Pennsylvania Company For Insurances On Lives And Granting Annuities v. Contrib-
utors to Pennsylvania Hospital, et al., 9 A. (2d) 269 (Sup. Ct., R. I., November, 1939).
"281 N. Y. 115, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939).
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poration and to which the courts can apply the cy pres principle. The court
did not classify this obligation. Possibly it has some elements of a con-
tractual obligation, but it seems more likely that restricted gifts to charitable
corporations in New York are henceforth to be recognized as creating a
fiduciary relationship which is sui generis.
It is noteworthy that in all three of these New York cases4 4 words of
trust were lacking in the terms of gift. In all three, however, the donors
had stated the purpose for which the gifts were to be used.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether a true trust is created by
a gift to a charitable corporation for one of its charter purposes when
expressed in trust language. The Restatement of Trusts45 declares that
no trust is thus created. The writer of a recent law review article4 6 takes
the opposite view and after a survey of the decisions in many states con-
cludes that Professor, Bogert (who was one of the draftsmen of the Restate-
ment) is correct when he says :47
"Occasionally it becomes important to learn whether a donor intended
to make an absolute gift to a charitable corporation to be used by it for
one or more of its corporate purposes, or desired to make the charitable
corporation trustee of a charitable trust. It is clear that there is a dis-
tinction in these two intents and the legal results of their expression."
Nevertheless, as has been noted above, the New York courts have held
that no trust is created even when the gift is expressed in trust language s.4
The St. Josepl's Hospital case was decided by the Court of Appeals on
July 11, 1939. On October 16, 1939 the Carnegie Foundation for the Ad-
vancement of Teaching (a corporation) instituted a proceeding in the Su-
preme Court, New York County, for permission to enter into a teachers'
pension refinancing plan and to use cy pres a part of its endowment for
annuity payments free from any restriction or limitation contained in the
terms of Mr. Andrew Carnegie's gift. The Attorney General consented
to the plan and the appropriate order cy pres was entered.4 9 The decision
has not been reported. This is interesting because it is an application, sub-
sequent to the St. Joseph's Hospital decision, of the cy pres doctrine to the
endowment of a charitable corporation.
"St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N. Y. 115, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939) ; Sherman
v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921) ; Matter of Walter, 150 Misc.
512, 269 N. Y. Supp. 402 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
"2 RiESTATE:mENT, TRUSTS (1935) c. 11, p. 1093.
"Lincoln, Gifts to Charitable Corporations (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 764.
,12 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 324, p. 1031.
'St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908).
"'Presumably the order was granted pursuant to the broad equity powers given to the
Supreme Court by Sec. 12, Personal Property Law (L. 1893), referred to in the petition.
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II
Endowment is commonly understood as a fund yielding income for the
support of an institution.5 0 The early cases construing endowments are
found chiefly in tax litigation. Some states had a policy of exempting from
taxation (1) the real property of a charitable corporation used for its
charitable purposes, and (2) the endowment of the charitable corpora-
tion. It has been held that endowment does not include real estate, even
when purchased with endowment funds.r1
During the recent years of acute financial distress for small institutions,
the question has been raised occasionally as to whether endowment par-
takes of the nature of a trust so that the cy pres principle is applicable,
or is the outright property of the corporation which its creditors may reach.
It has been held that the courts may apply cy pres to the endowment funds
of a college and that the funds given for endowment of the institution are
not available in satisfaction of the claims of its creditors. 5 2
Where the endowment fund was created by action of the corporation,
as in Hobbs v. Board of Education,58 it is suggested that possibly there
is no restriction on the fund and creditors may be paid from it. While
the Nebraska court held that the endowment in the Hobbs case was not
a trust to which the court could apply the cy pres doctrine, it nevertheless
proceeded to transfer the fund to another charitable corporation under the
"conceded judicial powers of the court.""4
The action of a board of trustees in setting aside unrestricted funds as an
endowment might create certain contractual or quasi trust obligations where
donors relied upon that action in making subsequent gifts. This apparently
is not considered in the cases. However, it seems likely that the New York
courts might find in such action an enforceable obligation, binding on the
institution, to keep the endowment intact and expend the income only. An
illustration of this situation is found in an Associated Press dispatch from
Baltimore under date of November 6, 1939. As printed in the New York
Times the dispatch read as follows :54*
"The Johns Hopkins University will match a $500,000 grant from the
Rockefeller Foundation and create a $1,000,000 endowment for the
120 C. J. 1255.
bState, First Reformed Dutch Church, pros. v. Lyon, 32 N. J. L. 360, (1867) ; State
v. Krollman, 38 N. J. L. 323 (1876).
6Graham Bros. Co. v. Galloway Woman's College, 190 Ark. 692, 81 S. W. (2d) 837
(1935) ; Starr v. Morningside College, 186 Iowa 790, 173 N. W. 231 (1919) ; Lupton v.
Leander Clark College, 194 Iowa 1008, 187 N. W. 496 (1922). Cf. Hobbs v. Board of
Education, 126 Neb. 416, 253 N. W. 627 (1934).
126 Neb. 416, 253 N. W. 627 (1934).
"'Id. at 440.
r"November 7, 1939, p. 27, col. 1.
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biological sciences. The Rockefeller grant was contingent on the uni-
versity providing an equal endowment. The university's matching fund
will be taken from the bequest of Louis J. Boury of New York, who
died in 1937 and left the residue of his estate to Johns Hopkins."
While the dispatch is not precise as to the facts, it may be that the Uni-
versity's contribution to endowment was a transfer from its unrestricted
funds and in that event the entire fund would appear to be set apart as a
permanent endowment (if construed under the New York rule) subject to
an obligation to preserve the principal and use the income only for work
in the biological sciences.
It appears in the Hobbs case that the Board of Trustees of Grand Island
College had invested a part of its endowment fund in a student dormitory
and when the college subsequently got into financial straits the Board claimed
that a like sum should be set aside from the general assets to reimburse the
endowment. The court said, as to that item:
"Claim of Grand Island College to reimburse the endowment fund
the sum of $26,726.41 which it withdrew from said fund any years
ago with which to build a girls' dormitory. This cannot be allowed.
When these funds were withdrawn they were converted into property
which cannot be separated from the general assets of the college to the
prejudice of creditors. The same is true of quite a number of other
misapplications of the fund. If there is any remedy for these acts it
lies with the successor in trust or the donors against the college
trustees."
55
In view of the cases it seems clear that funds given for endowment should
be treated as restricted gifts, if not as trusts, and that the principal of en-
dowments should be preserved for the purpose of producing revenue. Indeed,
in Associate Alumni v. Theologicql Seminary56 a gift to the defendant as
endowment for the establishment of a professorship was held to be a gift in
trust in which the donors retained sufficient interest to enable them. to enjoin
upon the defendant specific performance of the terms and conditions even
though there was no right of reverter attached to the original gift.
It is not clear whether endowment funds can properly be invested in the
college's own real estate. Institutions other than Grand Island College"
have sometimes invested their endowment funds in college buildings. Cer-
tain standards should be met .whenever any such investment is made, to safe-
guard the endowment principal, and these basic requirements include the
following: (1) Investment should be only in income-yielding property, which
is (2) so constructed as to pay a net income yielding a fair return at least
-126 Neb. 416, 437, 253 N. W. 627 (1934).
'26 App. Div. 144 (1st Dep't), mod., 163 N. Y. 417, 57 N. E. 626 (1900).
-Hobbs v. Board of Education, 126 Neb. 416, 253 N. W. 627 (1934).
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equal to the yield from endowment fund securities (3) after making annual
provision for depreciation and amortization sufficient to return the principal
sum to the fund.
III
The practice of commingling or pooling funds for investment is common
among institutions, but no cases have been found which expressly permit
it and only three that seem to prohibit it."
Where the terms of a gift to a charitable corporation contained language
expressly stating the donor's intention that the fund should be held "in
trust," some institutions have invested the fund separately. There seems
to be no uniformity of practice even as to the so-called trust funds except
in cases where the terms of gift expressly require segregated investment.
Where a gift is expressed not as a. trust but for "endowment," or is a
gift the income of which is to be used by the donor's direction for speci-
fied charter purposes of the donee corporation, many institutions, in order
to simplify their investment problems, have adopted the expedient of pooling
all such gifts with their unrestricted funds, investing them together as a
pooled fund. The separate funds are entered on the books at their initial
inventory values. When the average rate of income on the investments in
the pooled fund is computed, this rate is assigned to the principal of each
of the book funds and the income thus computed is expended for the desig-
nated uses of the several restricted funds. Capital gains usually accrue
only to the unrestricted funds, which likewise absorb losses.59
This practice of pooling funds for investment seemed fair enough and
legally permissible so long as the New York rule was, or was thought to
be, that the corporation was the absolute owner of its funds free of any
enforceable obligation of strict compliance with the expressed intention of
the donor. Now that the Court of Appeals has laid down the rule that
the corporation can be made to use each fund for the purpose designated
by its donor, the practice of pooling requires reexamination. It may be
debatable whether as a matter of law the obligation to use the income of
a particular fund for a specified purpose, which obligation the donee cor-
poration accepted as a condition of the gift, is satisfied by expending for
the directed use a sum equivalent to interest on the principal sum of the
gift computed at the average rate of income on the corporation's pooled
funds.
mfoore v. McKenzie, 112 Me. 356, 92 Atl. 296 (1914) ; Attorney General v. City of
Lowell, 246 Mass. 312, 141 N. E. 45 (1923) ; Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 125 N. Y.
581, 26 N. E. 801 (1891).
6E. S. Erwin (Assistant Comptroller Stanford University) "The Policy of Merged
Investments and their Legal Aspects" read before Ass'n. of Business Officers of Universi-
ties and Colleges, at Chicago, May, 1937. Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation and
the Charitable Trast (1938) 24 WAsH. U. L. Q. 1.
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It has long been accepted as the rule that a trustee may not, without
express permission given in the instrument creating the trust, mingle the
funds of one trust with the funds of other trusts or with his own property.60
In the Restatement of Trusts there is the following summary of the rule:
"The trustees of a charitable trust, like the trustees of a private trust,
are subject to duties to administer the trust . . . to keep the trust
property separate from their individual property. .. .
The rule against mingling private trust funds may be relaxed somewhat.
The Restatement concedes that where "it would be unreasonable and not
subserve any purpose in protecting the interests of the beneficiaries of the
several trusts to require him to keep separate the funds of the different
trusts, it may be proper for the trustee to mingle funds of the different
trusts by deposit thereof in a common bank account. '62
Professor Bogert is authority for the following statement:
"It is also a breach of trust of this type if the trustee commingles
two distinct trust funds. . . .There has been some tendency, however,
to permit the mingling of two or more trust funds in an investment,
provided the trustee keeps accurate books with regard to the shares
of each trust, and each cestui is given notice of his exact interest." 63
Several cases are cited by the text writers as authority for this relaxation
of the strict rule that prohibits the mingling of private trusts.6 4 While
there have been found no cases that distinguish between a charitable trustee
and a private trustee, as to their right to commingle trust funds, neither one
is precisely analogous to the board of trustees of a charitable corporation.
It has been held that such boards are not subject to all the restrictions and
regulations usually imposed on trustees; indeed, both prevailing and dis-
senting opinions in the St. Joseph/s Hospital case agreed that the charitable
corporation was not bound by all the rules applicable to a technical trustee.65
However, none of the cases had to do expressly with the question of mingling
funds.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Moore v. McKenzie6 6 criti-
cizes mingling. The trustees of a charitable trust were directed to main-
tain a hospital. The following question was certified to the court:
-2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 379, p. 1173.
"'See note 60, supra.
0l RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 179, p. 457.
03 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 596, p. 1888.
'Matter of Kohler, 231 N. Y. 353, 132 N. E. 114 (1921); Gould v. Gould, 126 Misc.
54, 213 N. Y. Supp. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; Matter of Watson, 81 Misc. 89, 142 N. Y. Supp.
1058 (Surr. Ct. 1913) ; Jones v. Harsha, 233 Mich. 499, 206 N. W. 979 (1926).
0St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N. Y. 115, 123, 125, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939).
91112 Me. 356, 92 Atl. 296 (1914).
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"(5) Can the trust fund of $15,000 for the benefit of Stella R.
McKenzie and the trust fund for the benefit of the Webber Hospital
Association be invested together and the net income be paid to each pro
rata, or shall there be two distinct funds set apart ?"
The court said:
"We know of no authority of law for the mingling of trust funds
proposed by this inquiry. Not for a moment could it be considered
if the two trusts were to be administered by distinct trustees. That
the trustees were or are the same, or that the corpus of each fund
finally is to be paid to the same person can make no difference. Each
trust must stand alone, otherwise losses legitimately to be borne, with
corresponding loss of income by one, could be imposed in part upon the
other."
It is possible, although not decided, that the mingling of trust funds
proposed by the certified question might have been permitted if both trusts
had been exclusively for charitable purposes. The use of one of the trust
funds was to an individual for life, with the remainder over to the charit-
able use. The court does not discuss this distinguishing feature but states
that it makes no difference in the result that the corpus of the fund finally
is to be paid to the same person.6 7 Of some significance, in view of the
St. Josept's Hospital case, is the reason the Maine court assigned for its
holding that the trusts should not be commingled. Great weight was given
'to the possibility that income loss which should be borne by one of the
trusts might, as the result of commingling, be imposed in part upon the
other trust. If the donee is subject to an obligation to use the income of
the donor's fund for the uses specified by' the donor, then the commingling
of the fund with other funds might result in loss of income in that fund, as
against its possible income if the fund had been kept separate.
The only case found in which the New York courts have considered
this question in relation to a charitable gift is Fosdick v. Towi4n of Hemp-
stead,68 where a bequest was left to the town "to be kept as a fund for
the support of the poor of said town, and to be known as 'The Hewlett Fund.'"
This was held to be a trust fund which should be kept. intact and separate
from the other moneys of the town.
In Attorney General v. City of Lowell it was held that the impairment
in principal of a fund for the poor, which had never been segregated, must
be restored and the terms of the gift obeyed by the city. The court said:
71d. at 360.
"125 N. Y. 581, 26 N. E. 801 (1891). (The trust was thereafter held invalid for in-
definiteness, but the decision on that point would be contra today under the Tilden Act.
PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 12; REAL PROPERTY LAW § 113).
246 Mass. 312, 141 N. E. 45 (1923).
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"The defendant ought to have kept this bequest separate and apart as a
distinct fund." 70
While these seem to be the only cases which consider directly the question
of mingling of funds by charitable institutions (the town and city were con-
sidered charitable corporations as to the funds in question), there are many
cases in which such mingling in the case of ordinary trusts has been over-
looked in equity.71
There may be practical taxation reasons in special cases why mingling of
funds by a charitable corporation would be undesirable and might be regarded
with judicial disfavor. Charitable corporations generally are exempt from
federal income and excess profits taxes if no part of their income "inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."'7 2  Recently the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, held the Scholarship
Endowment Foundation subject to income tax notwithstanding that it was
an educational corporation, for the reason that it held its endowment subject
to an agreement to pay annuities to the donors.73 The taxpayer has filed a
petition with the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, on
which that court has not yet acted.74 There were some special circumstances
in connection with the organization of the Scholarship Endowment Founda-
tion which undoubtedly influenced the decision.
Thus, where a charitable corporation receives funds and agrees, at the
donor's request, to pay all or part of the income for a period to a "private
individual," it seems advisable for the corporation not to commingle the gift
with its other funds. Even when the terms of gift permit commingling,
present tax uncertainties make it desirable to segregate such gifts.
It has also been suggested that the recent New York statute permitting the
pooling of funds by trust companies in common trust funds7 'may furnish
an argument that so-called practical mingling has been examined and approved
by the legislature. It can as readily be argued, however, that this indicates
that a similar enabling statute is necessary if charitable corporations are to
enjoy the privilege.
Possibly the mingling of funds as to which a charitable corporation has a
contractual or quasi trust obligation may be justified by special circumstances.
Obviously it tends to average the risks, and the expense of administration
is considerably reduced.
"Id. at 323.
'Matter of Nesmith, 140 N. Y. 609, 35 N. E. 942 (1894) ; Price v. Holman, 135 N. Y.
124, 32 N. E. 124 (1892); Gould v. Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213 N. Y Supp. 286 (Sup.Ct. 1925) ; Re Patrick's Estate, 162 Pa. 175, 29 At. 639 (1894) ; Appeal of Biddle, 129
Pa. 26, 18 Atl. 474 (1889).
72INTERXAL REVENUE CODE § 101 (6).
'Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 10th 1939).
"'Certiorari filed November 20, 1939.
'BANKING LAw § 100-c.
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Yet in view of the cases it cannot be concluded that the practice of com-
mingling funds will go unchallenged. The decision in the St. Joseph's Hos-
pital case leaves the question in doubt, making advisable a review of the
different funds held by institutions for restricted uses and for endowment in
order to ascertain whether the enforceable obligations attached to the gifts
are adequately met when the fund is mingled for investment with other funds
of the institution.
IV
If the decision in the St. Joseph's Hospital case indicates a trend in N~w
York State toward imposing on the boards of charitable corporations some
of the duties of ordinary trustees, it may be advisable to reconsider also the
question as to whether such boards are subject to the rule as to investments
laid down for trustees in the Personal Property Law.76 While it is settled77
that trustees of charitable trusts are held to the same strict rules which govern
the investment of private trustees, it does not follow that the boards of charit-
able corporations are similarly restricted. There seems to be no decision on
this point in New York State, and very few elsewhere in this country.
In Boston v. Curley78 the Massachusetts court was asked for instructions
as to the proper custody, management and control of two funds held by a
corporation for charitable purposes pursuant to instructions in the will of
Benjamin Franklin and the highest court bad this to say on the subject of
investment :
"Every member of that corporation is charged with the obligations of a
trustee and must exercise as to every investment his best judgment and
wise discretion. To make investments is fundamental, not merely ad-
ministrative, in the administration of a trust. To be a manager of the
fund involves the performance of personal duty, which as to investments
to be made cannot be delegated to a committee or an agent."79
A more recent case, decided in 1934, is Graham Bros. Co. v. Galloway
Wman's College. ° The gift was subject to reversion if the college should
cease to function. That event occurred, and the donor's representatives
sought to charge the trustees of the college with personal accountability for
loss arising from the investment of the gift. It was held: that the board was
subject to the same investment rules which govern ordinary trustees in
Arkansas, but the court found as a fact that in view of the difficult invest-
ment conditions between 1930 and 1934 the board of the college bad exer-
"'Sec. 21.
72 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 393.
"276 Mass. 549, 177 N. E. 557 (1931).
"Id. at 562.
"190 Ark. 692, 81 S. W. (2d) 837 (1935).
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cised sound business judgment in investing the endowment fund in the note
of the college! The decision is difficult to follow because, while it seems to
lay down a broad rule of rigid trustee responsibility, it applies the rule in
such a way as practically to open the door for any use of funds by the
trustees provided no bad faith is shown.
In Hobbs v. Board of Education8l the question of investing endowment
funds in a college dormitory was raised. Without deciding the point, the
court referred to this investment as a misapplication of funds.
It is stated by Professor Scott in his work on Trusts82 that the rules applic-
able to investments by trustees are not necessarily applicable to a charitable
corporation as distinguished from a charitable trust, it being a question of
interpretation whether statutes applicable to ordinary trustees are likewise
applicable to charitable corporations. In American Law of Charities"3 the
statement is made that charitable trustees cannot invest trust funds in their
own business or for their own benefit or accommodation without becoming
an insurer of the fund and its productiveness.8 4
The authorities are conflicting and unsatisfactory. It is difficult to know
what the rule would be if a case were to arise today. In the Graham case8 5
there is an obvious inconsistency between the rule laid down by the court and
the application of the rule to the facts. It is, however, well known that
boards of trustees of charitable corporations have not limited their invest-
ments to those permitted by the strict rules governing ordinary trustees and
fiduciaries."6 While the Court of Appeals in the St. Josep' s Hospital case
stated that charitable corporations are not subject to all the limitations and
rules that apply to technical trustees, the effect of the decision is to impose on
such corporations certain obligations of a fiduciary nature. It may, therefore,
be pertinent to inquire whether one of these fiduciary obligations is that they
shall meet ordinary trust standards as to mingling and investment.
V
The St. Joseph's Hospital case was an action by the Hospital for a judicial
declaration of its rights and obligations with respect to the endowment. It
therefore does not decide how the obligation would have been enforced by
the courts in the event of a threatened or actual breach. Remedies which
the courts have considered, in New York and elsewhere, include suits for
specific performance of the terms of gifts, ouster of the corporation in
-126 Neb. 416, 253 N. W. 627 (1934).
"3 ScoTr, TRUSTS (1939) § 389.
"3ZOLLMANN, AmERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) 324.
"Bangor v. Beal, 85 Me. 129, 26 At. 1112 (1892).
190 Ark. 692, 81 S. W. (2d) 837 (1935).
'See note 59, supra.
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quo warranta proceedings and actions to remove the directors or trustees of
the corporation.
In the St. Joseph's Hospital case8 7 the court said that the Attorney Gen-
eral may maintain a suit in equity to compel the corporation to hold the
property for the charitable purposes for which it was given, citing the Re-
statement of Trusts.88
There appears to be but one New York decision in which the right of a
donor to specific performance was litigated and upheld. In Associate
Alunmi v. Theological Seminary"9 the fund in question was collected by
the alumni association and transferred to the Seminary for the endowment
of a professorship with the right reserved to the alumni, in the event of
a vacancy in the chair, to nominate the incumbent. Disputes arose and in
consequence the chair was left vacant. The Appellate Division90 directed
the Seminary to surrender the fund and transfer it back to the Associate
Alumni. The Court of Appeals modified9 ' the judgment below so that,
instead of directing a return of the fund to the alumni, the plaintiff was
directed to hold the fund in trust and apply it on the terms and conditions
specified in the resolutions under which the fund was given to the Seminary
and accepted by it. While this gift was made prior to the Tilden Act and
therefore could have been valid only as an outright gift, the dispute arose
thereafter hnd the court held that there was a trust which it would enforce
at the donor's suit although there was no provision for reverter. As donor
and possessor of the right to nominate to the professorship, the Associate
Alumni was held to have sufficient standing to maintain the action to enforce
the terms of the gift.
In Mills v. Da7visonU2 the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals,
although divided, held that a conveyance of land for church purposes
created a trust and that the donor, as the founder of a charity, had stand-
ing in equity to restrain the diversion of the property from the uses for
which it had been given. This decision did not rest either on a right of
reverter or any specifically reserved right to control the subsequent en-
joyment of the property.
Whatever the rule may be in other states, however, it seems that in
New York the donor may enforce the terms of his gift if he has a right
of reverter or some continuing power of control over the subject of the
w281 N. Y. 115, 119, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939).
12 RESTATEMENT, TRusTs (1935) c. 11, p. 1093.
826 App. Div. 144, 49 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1st Dep't 1898), mod., 163 N. Y. 417, 57
N. E. 626 (1900).
0Ibid.
163 N. Y. 417, 57 N. E. 626 (1900).
154 N. J. Eq. 659, 35 At!. 1072 (1896).
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gift, its uses or the persons who administer it. Undoubtedly, as the Court
of Appeals has recently said,93 the Attorney General may maintain such
an action.
Enforcement of the terms of gift by suit against the corporation is not
always a satisfactory remedy. The court can order specific performance
and direct that the corporation restore to the fund any losses which may
have been caused by improper administration of the gift,9 4 or it may oust
the corporation from its charter and apply the gift cy pres.9 5 The former
remedy apparently has never been ordered in New York. It has, of course,
the inherent weakness that where the wrong has already' been done the cor-
poration frequently has no funds with which to repair the damage. It is
the equivalent of locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen. The
alternative remedy of ouster is equally futile or more so. Ouster dislodges
the beneficiary as well as the trustee and it becomes necessary to transfer
the fund, or what is left of it, by the cy pres device to another charity which,
presumably, is less desirable in-the eyes of the donor inasmuch as he did
not select it. In the event the ousted corporation holds other funds and as
to them has fulfilled all its obligations, there is the further difficulty that
such other funds will also be adversely affected.
Can the directors of charitable corporations be held responsible for their
acts and omissions? The directors of business corporations have certain
duties to the shareholders, and correlative rights lie with the shareholders
to remove the directors and hold them accountable for acts outside the scope
of their authority. Whether or not the trustees of charitable corporations
should be held to the same standards as those imposed on the directors of
corporations operated for profit, the enforcement of that accountability may
be more difficult where the charitable corporation has neither members,
shareholders nor any other internal organization capable of managing its
disciplinary affairs. The directors of charitable corporations are public-
spirited citizens who serve without remuneration, often at considerable
sacrifice, and who rightly are accorded greater consideration and possibly
should be held to less rigid standards than those imposed on the directors
of corporations operated for profit. In some cases, too, the trustees of .
charity are themselves incorporated and self-perpetuating, and therefore
incompetent effectively to discipline themselves.9 6
No New York case has been found in which the court has surcharged
"See note 87, supra.
"'Attorney-General v. City of Lowell, 246 Mass. 312, 141 N. E. 45 (1923).05People v. Dispensary and Hospital Society of the Women's Institute, 7 Lans. 304
(N. Y. 1873).
See UNIVRSITY LAW (1892) c. 378 (since amended). State v. Ausmus, 35 S. W.
1021 (Tenn. 1895).
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the directors or trustees of a corporate charity for improper administration
of its funds.97 In the absence of express statutory authority, if they are
to be removed from office there must be found some excuse for disregard-
ing the corporate form. The directors of a charitable corporation do not
individually hold legal title to the corporate property and are not in the
true sense of the word trustees. The act of incorporation may be thought
to limit their responsibility to that which they owe to the body corporate.
It was early thought that the trustees of religious corporations could be
removed by courts of equity as for breach of trust.98 In 1854, however,
the case of Robertson v. Bulions 9 was decided and the earlier decisions
disapproved. In the Robertson case the court held that it had no jurisdiction
to remove the trustees who were said to be merely the managing officers
of the corporation. This decision has been cited frequently. As recently
as 1923100 the principle of the Robertson case was affirmed on the ground
that the court had no power to remove the officers and directors of religious
corporations without the sanction of a statute.
By statute New York authorizes actions against corporate officers, directors
and trustees and provides that the officers, directors and trustees may be
compelled to account, may be held personally liable and may be suspended or
removed.' 0 1 By other sections of the same statute these remedies are made
inapplicable to religious, municipal and public benefit corporations and to a
limited degree also to educational corporations.10 2  The right of judicial
suspension or removal from office is expressly denied except on final judg-
ment in an action brought by the Attorney General,'0 3 but the other actions
may be brought by the corporation itself, or by a creditor, receiver, trustee in
bankruptcy, director, or officer of the corporation.
The fact of incorporation may not protect the trustees from individual
responsibility in other states.10 4 Indeed, trustees were held responsible in
"Cf. Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N. E. 557 (1931).
"Kniskern v. The Lutheran Churches, etc., 1 Sandf. Ch. 439 (N. Y. 1844). See Lawyer
v. Cipperly, 7 Paige 281 (N. Y. 1838). Cf. Bowden v. M'Leod, 1 Edw. Ch. 588, 591(N. Y. 1833).
°11 N. Y. 243 (1854).
u'Fiske v. Beaty, 206 App. Div. 349, 201 N. Y. Supp. 441 (3d Dep't 1923). The court
said, at p. 361, "Certainly this court, without the sanction of a statute, has not the power
to shorten their terms by removing them from office. Not only has no such sanction been
given but the power of removal has been expressly denied to it."
""GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 60, 61.
'-GENERAL CORPORATIoN LAW § 130. This section states, as to educational corporations,
that Sections 60 and 61 shall not apply ".... to any corporation which the regents of the
university have power to dissolve, except in aid of its liquidation under such dissolution,
upon the application of the regents, or of the trustees of such a corporation." In this
connection see EDucATioN LAW § 63.
"'GENERAL COR'ORATION LAW § 136.
"
0Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N. E. 557 (1931); Nelson v. Cushing, 2
Cush. 519 (Mass. 1848) ; State v. Ausmus, 35 S. W. 1021 (Tenn. 1895).
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early cases in this state.10 5 The statutory remedies referred to above, 10 6
read in conjunction with the new definition of fiduciary obligation of charit-
able corporations as stated in the St. osephs Hospital case, may result in
a stricter interpretation of the accountability of trustees of charitable cor-
porations in New York.
It is evident that many of these questions, raised by the decision in the
St. Joseph's Hospital case, can not be satisfactorily answered now. Restricted
gifts to charitable corporations are certainly not true trusts, yet the court
attributes to them a fiduciary character. It serves no useful purpose for
the courts to establish in varying situations an implied trust or a quasi trust.
At last, after a long course of confused development of the New York law
as to charitable trusts and gifts to charitable corporations, the courts have
penetrated the legal maze and seem to have evolved a sensible doctrine of a
fiduciary obligation, sui generis. This is an important milestone in the law
of the subject, especially in a society where the charitable corporation has
almost entirely supplanted the individual charitable trustee.
Now it remains for the courts or the legislature to resolve the related
problems. How many of the trust rules and limitations are applicable to
this fiduciary relationship and how far the enforceable obligations extend
to the unrestricted as well as the restricted funds of charitable corporations,
are questions still unsettled. To avoid further confusion and protracted
uncertainty, and to furnish the sound background that will encourage the
essential benefactions of donors to eleemosynary, religious and educational
corporations, some immediate clarification of public policy through legis-
lative enactment is eminently desirable. In particular, the trustees of charit-
able corporations should be informed as to the limits of the law applicable
to their investment policies, and donors are entitled to know what remedies,
if any, are available to them for enforcement of the terms of their gifts.
"'See note 98, supra.
'GENERAL Co, o1-roN LAw §§ 60, 61.
